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I 
Badiou's Philosophical Heritage 
Sean Bowden and Simon Duffy 
In the wake of the numerous translations of Badiou's works that 
have appeared in recent years, including the translation of the 
second volume of his major work, Logics of Worlds: Being and 
Event II, there has been a marked increase in interest in the philo-
sophical underpinnings of his oeuvre. The papers brought together 
in this volume provide a range of incisive and critical engagements 
with Badiou's philosophical heritage and the philosophical prob-
lems his work engages, both directly and indirectly. Our aim is to 
offer a balanced assessment of the ways in which Badiou responds 
to various philosophical thinkers, arguments and traditions, and 
of the arguments that he employs to do so. 
The volume is divided into three sections: I. Philosophy's 
Mathematical Condition; II. Philosophical Notions and 
Orientations; and III. Philosophical Figures. The first explores 
the philosophico-mathematical underpinnings of Badiou's oeuvre. 
The next engages with a number of key philosophical concepts 
and orientations that provide a critical context for an engagement 
with Badiou's work. And the third offers in-depth analyses of 
some of the key thinkers that constitute a large part of Badiou's 
philosophical heritage. 
This present, introductory chapter explores a number of 
Badiou's remarks which explicitly treat the relation of his work to 
the discipline of philosophy more generally, and gives an overview 
of the ground that will be covered throughout the collection. We 
will also here make a few general comments about the importance, 
for Badiou, of philosophy's 'mathematical condition'. 
I 
2 Badiou and Philosophy 
Badiou and Philosophy 
As is well known, in his first Manifesto for Philosophy, Badiou 
argues that philosophy has certain extra-philosophical 'condi-
tions' which are required for it to take place. These conditions, 
which are of four types, are the 'generic' or 'truth procedures' 
resulting from major upheavals or events in the fields of science, 
politics, art and love. The specific role of philosophy is to propose 
a unified conceptual space for - or, as Badiou also puts it, to think 
the 'compossibility' of - its contemporary conditions (MP 3 3-7). 
In so doing, philosophy is able to seize upon and elaborate, in 
novel ways, those new possibilities of existence which are nascent 
in its external, evental conditions. 
At the same time, however, still following Badiou's Manifesto 
for Philosophy, philosophy since Descartes has internally main-
tained certain 'nodal concepts' which organise the thinking of 
these external and diverse conditions within the same conceptual 
space. These nodal concepts are, for Badiou, being, truth and the 
subject (MP 32; see also SM 117-18). Of course, these concepts 
have their specific correlates in each case, depending on the par-
ticular philosophical system under consideration. In Badiou's own 
philosophy, as is well known, these correlates include notions such 
as the State, the event and fidelity. And as Ed Pluth and James 
Williams show in Chapters 6 and 7 of this volume, certain con-
ceptions of materialism and time also have a decisive role to play 
in Badiou's philosophical system. What is crucial in any case, as 
Badiou argues, is that the deployment of the philosophical con-
cepts of being, truth and the subject is grounded in certain events 
having occurred in the domains of science, politics, art and love 
(MP 38, 79-80). In other words, philosophy's external conditions 
somehow clarify and orient the task of philosophy, even in the 
concepts which philosophy internally deploys. 
What, then, are the contemporary, conditioning events whose 
compossibility Badiou feels himself obliged to think, and how 
exactly do they bear on the philosophical concepts of the subject, 
truth and being? Firstly, with political events such as May '68 and 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution, as well as with the advent of a 
new discourse on love in Lacanian psychoanalysis, Badiou declares 
that we have seen the emergence of a new kind of dialectics whose 
terms - that is, the political or amorous subject - need not refer 
to a given or objective essence, such as a class or a sexual essence. 
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This is a crucial point for Badiou, many of the details of which 
are examined here in the chapters by Nina Power, and Justin 
Clemens and Adam Bartlett. Secondly, with the artistic event asso-
ciated with the poetry of Holderlin, Mallarme and Celan (among 
others), Badiou arrives at the idea that truth - here, poetic truth 
- need not entail a reference to an object. Finally, in the order of 
science and the matheme, the event which is the development of 
set theory from Cantor to Paul Cohen has given us the concept 
of an 'indiscernible' or 'generic multiplicity' (that is, a multiple 
falling under no particular determinant), allowing us to rigorously 
think the truth of the being qua being of any given multiple as 
pure multiplicity 'without one' (MP 79-96). The importance of 
this last event for Badiou's philosophy is examined throughout the 
collection, but most particularly in the papers comprising the first 
section. 
So how do the nodal concepts of philosophy organise the 
thinking together of these events, even as these events clarify the 
meaning of the concepts of being, truth and the subject? Firstly, it 
is by declaring that a truth has no need of the category of the object 
because truth is itself an indiscernible or generic multiple which, as 
the result of an infinite procedure, will have been 'subtracted' from 
all exact designations and their corresponding discerned multiples. 
Secondly, it is by arguing that such a 'truth procedure' is founded 
upon the affirmation of an 'undecidable' event which comes to 
supplement a given multiple-situation. The infinity of multiples 
comprising this given situation are then 'verified' as being con-
nected in some way to the supplementary event, which in turn 
leads to the ongoing production, within multiple-being itself, of 
the truth of this event-supplemented situation as a purely generic 
multiple. Finally, it is by affirming that while truth has no neces-
sary relation to a given object, it is inseparable from a subject: the 
subject being that which verifies the connection of the infinity of 
multiples comprising a situation to the supplementary event and, 
in so doing, must be thought of as a finite fragment of this infinite 
generic procedure (MP 9 5-6, 108). It is in this schematic way that 
Badiou's philosophy thinks the compossibility of the truth proce-
dures which have their origin in the aforementioned contemporary 
events in the domains of science, politics, art and love. 
All this is not to say, however, that by affirming the dependence 
of philosophy on extra-philosophical conditions the specificity of 
philosophy collapses. Indeed, Badiou makes it clear in Manifesto 
4 Badiou and Philosophy 
that insofar as philosophy must systematically think the compos-
sibility of all four of its very disparate conditions, it cannot be 
'sutured' to or identified with any particular one of them (MP 
6 5-6). Moreover, as Badiou explicitly states in the introduction 
to Being and Event, philosophy circulates not only between its 
conditions, but also between these conditions and its own history 
(BE 3).1 The independence of the discipline of philosophy is thus 
also due to the relationship it maintains with its own history. In 
fact, it is clear from a brief glance at the table of contents of any 
of Badiou's major works that significant portions of his oeuvre are 
dedicated to analyses of numerous venerable philosophers and the 
concepts and themes they addressed. Plato, Descartes and Hegel 
are singled out by Badiou, in typical exaggerated fashion, as 'the 
only three crucial philosophers' (LW 527). But as Brian Smith and 
Graham Harman convincingly demonstrate in their contributions 
to this volume, philosophers such as Sartre and Heidegger were 
also indispensable for Badiou. 
But two further things also follow from Badiou's assertion that 
philosophy is inseparable from its own history and concepts. 
Firstly, as he makes clear in texts such as Metapolitics and Logics 
of Worlds, citing Althusser and Sylvain Lazarus, it follows that the 
'effects' of philosophy's external conditions on philosophy in some 
sense remain internal to philosophy (M 54-5; LW 518-19). And 
secondly, it follows that philosophy should, at least in principle, 
be able to discuss these internal, conditioned effects in specifically 
philosophical terms. Indeed, with regard to this last point, Talia 
Morag argues in Chapter 8 that Badiou could enter into a pro-
ductive dialogue with contemporary neo-pragmatists about the 
philosophical importance of sets. And in Chapter r 3, Jon Roffe, 
among other things, laments the philosophical discussion that 
could have taken place between Deleuze and Badiou on the ques-
tions of 'multiple being' and the relationship between mathematics 
and ontology. 
Some twenty years after the publication of the first Manifesto 
for Philosophy, Badiou published his Second Manifesto for 
Philosophy. He argues that the first Manifesto was concerned 
above all to assert the existence of philosophy against the attempts 
to declare its 'death' by exclusively 'suturing' it either to science 
(analytic philosophy, positivism), politics (dogmatic Marxism), art 
(Nietzscheans and Heideggerians) or love (Levinasians, Lacanian 
'anti-philosophy'). By the time of the publication of the Second 
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Manifesto, however, Badiou thinks that philosophy's 'inexistence' 
is no longer the whole problem. The problem now is that philoso-
phy is 'everywhere'. Philosophy has become ubiquitous, but it has 
also become servile, assimilated with 'conservative morality' and 
the uncritical defence of 'democratic dogma' (SM 67-9 ). Asserting 
the existence of philosophy will thus no longer simply amount to 
thinking the systematic compossibility of all four of its conditions 
in the manner outlined above (MP 6 5 ). It must also involve a 
certain 'de-moralising' of philosophy, which is to say that philoso-
phy must become a little 'reckless', 'corrupt the youth' and desta-
bilise dominant opinion (SM 69-7I). In other words, the primary 
mode of philosophy must become the polemic if philosophy is to 
avoid being merely another means of legitimising the legal and 
ethical status quo. 2 
Of course, Badiou thinks that philosophy's commitment to uni-
versal truths is its own distinct means of de-moralising itself (SM 
71-2). Indeed, it is clear that that fidelity to a truth which is always 
in excess of the status quo is inevitably conflictual. But surely phi-
losophy's polemical attitude must also be carried into the domain 
of philosophy itself, in order to avoid the consolidation of new, 
philosophical status quos. Moreover, a point which is relevant 
to this present volume, perhaps philosophy's combative attitude 
must also be brought to philosophical commentary, if only to 
prevent uncritical scholarship mistaking itself for the elaboration 
of new possibilities for thought. 
So it appears that we can now draw upon a number of the 
points examined above in order to contextualise this project, in 
terms Badiou would approve of, as a critical and, at times, com-
bative examination of Badiou's relation to, impact on and rele-
vance for the discipline of philosophy. The collection as a whole is 
thus characterised by the way in which it brings together a number 
of critical studies of Badiou's relation to various philosophers 
(Althusser, Deleuze, Heidegger, Lautman, Marx, Plato, Quine, 
Sartre), philosophical concepts (being, events, freedom, the infi-
nite, the subject, time, truth) and philosophical movements or ori-
entations (communism, Marxism, materialism, neo-pragmatism). 
The volume also examines Badiou's relationship to a number of 
thinkers who, while not themselves philosophers (at least in the 
standard sense of that term), have nevertheless had major impacts 
on philosophical thought: the psychoanalyst and 'anti-philoso-
pher' Lacan, but also mathematicians such as Cantor, Cohen, 
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Grothendieck, Eilenberg and Mac Lane. Indeed, the significance of 
mathematical thought for Badiou's philosophy cannot be under-
estimated, and so we have devoted an entire section to examining 
philosophy's 'mathematical condition'. Some general remarks on 
this topic are thus also warranted here, by way of introduction. 
Philosophy's Mathematical Condition 
Mathematics has a dual function in Badiou's philosophy. On the 
one hand, mathematics plays the central role in the determination 
of Badiou's ontology. And on the other hand, mathematics has the 
privileged status of being the paradigm of science and of scientific 
enquiry in general, and is therefore instrumental in the determina-
tion of science as a truth procedure. 
Science, including mathematics, proceeds by following experi-
mental lines of enquiry that are established by new discoveries. 
What differentiates mathematics from science is that it is only in 
mathematics that a problem can be solved unequivocally. Badiou 
maintains that, insofar as thought formulates a problem, it is only 
in mathematics that it can or will definitively be solved, however 
long it takes. He notes that the history of mathematics is littered 
with examples of breakthroughs that resulted from proving or 
disproving conjectures first proposed by the Greeks more than 
two thousand years ago. What this means for Badiou is that math-
ematics does not acknowledge categories such as the unthinkable 
or the unthought, which he characterises as spiritualist because 
they exceed the resources of human reason, or those according to 
which we cannot resolve problems nor respond to questions, such 
as sceptical categories. Science in general, on the other hand, strug-
gles in this respect, and is deemed by Badiou not to be reliable on 
this point. What is distinct about mathematics as a science is its 
abstract axiomatic foundation. And he argues that it is this foun-
dation that provides the infrastructure for the characterisation of 
being qua being. According to Badiou, 'mathematics teaches us 
about what must be said concerning what is; and not about what 
it is permissible to say concerning what we think there is.'3 
Badiou considers Cantor's invention of set theory to be the 
archetypal event that allows mathematics to henceforth and ret-
rospectively be understood as the science of being qua being. The 
much debated proposition from Being and Event, that 'mathemat-
ics is ontology' (BE 4), is a philosophical idea that is conditioned 
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by this event. The general ontology that Badiou develops in Being 
and Event draws upon a number of subsequent developments in 
mathematics that show felicity to this event, namely the Zermelo-
Fraenkel axiomatisation of set theory and the open series of exten-
sions of these axioms, including in particular those by Kurt Godel, 
who introduced the notion of constructible sets, and Paul Cohen, 
who developed the method of forcing and generic sets. Tzuchien 
Tho examines the implications of this Cantorian event and the 
problems it poses for Badiou in Chapter 2. 
The characterisation of mathematics as ontology has a direct 
bearing on how Badiou understands the nature of the relation 
between science and mathematics. For example, he considers 
physics to be 'the investigation of matter, the very concept of 
matter', and he argues that 'the more you decompose the concept 
of matter into its most elementary constituents, the more you move 
into a field of reality which can only be named or identified with 
increasingly complex mathematical operations' (E 130). Badiou 
endorses the fact that in nearly all scientific theories, the structures 
of physical systems are modelled or described in terms of math-
ematical structures. Mathematics is generally considered to be 
applied in this way when the scientist postulates that a given area 
of the physical world exemplifies a certain mathematical structure. 
However, Badiou goes further than this. Rather than there being 
an analogical relation between the structure of the physical world 
and the mathematical theory that allows it to be modelled or 
reconstructed, Badiou considers mathematics to actually articulate 
being itself. Mathematics doesn't just provide a description, repre-
sentation or interpretation of being. Mathematics itself is what can 
be thought of being simpliciter.4 It is for this reason that Badiou 
maintains that axiomatic set theory is the science of being as pure 
multiplicity, or of 'the presentation of presentation' (BE 27), that 
is, of the presentation of what is presented in a situation. What 
this means is that Badiou figures mathematics itself as that which 
guarantees the access of the natural sciences to presented reality. 
With the proposition 'mathematics is ontology', Badiou con-
signs the task of ontology to mathematics, and in so doing liber-
ates philosophy from the burden of the Heideggerian question of 
being. However, this doesn't liberate philosophy completely from 
dealing with the problems associated with the Seinsfrage, but 
rather recasts the role of philosophy in this respect from its histori-
cal preoccupation with ontology to the task of metaontology. Sean 
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Bowden looks at some of the dialectical implications of this shift 
from ontology to metaontology in Chapter 3, and Simon Duffy 
examines the importance of Plato to Badiou for making this move 
in Chapter 4. One of the tasks of philosophy as metaontology is 
to articulate the relation to being that is displayed by the truth 
procedures operating in the different generic procedures. Because 
mathematics, as the basis of science, itself belongs to one of these 
four generic procedures, philosophy must remain attentive to 
those truth procedures in mathematics that follow experimental 
lines of enquiry and that continue to develop new articulations of 
the presentation of being qua being. This line of research is evident 
in a number of Badiou's subsequent texts, including Numbers and 
Number, where Badiou draws upon the development of surreal 
numbers to extend the universe of ordinals up to the reals, and in 
Logics of Worlds, where Badiou attempts to address his depend-
ence on set theory in Being and Event by deploying a category-
theoretic presentation of set theory, namely topos theory. Yet 
just how successful Badiou is in respecting the implications of the 
experimental lines of enquiry that mathematics opens up for the 
presentation of being qua being remains an open question. 
Category theory is the programme in mathematics that has estab-
lished itself as an alternative power of unification in mathematics 
that challenges the dominant role set theory has traditionally 
played in this respect. Although category theory does appear to 
be the historical continuation of set theory, the concept of 'cat-
egorisation' is not a technical refinement of the concept of set but 
rather represents a profound conceptual change in mathematics. 
Category theory allows you to work on mathematical structures 
without the need to first reduce them to sets. Despite this, Badiou's 
deployment of category theory in Logics of Worlds restricts itself 
to topos theory, which is the category-theoretic presentation of 
set theory. This narrow deployment of category theory betrays 
Badiou's work as being both overly bound to its early set-theoret-
ical underpinnings, and as being quite limited in its exploration 
of the full richness of what category theory has to offer for the 
presentation of being qua being. The extent to which this can be 
understood to pose problems for Badiou's work is explored by 
Anindya Bhattacharyya in Chapter 5. 
The Cantorian event, the dialectic, Plato and Category theory 
- these are the issues that orient the papers on Badiou and math-
ematics in the first section of this volume. 
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Badiou: Critical Connections 
As noted at the outset, this volume is divided into three sections: 
'Philosophy's Mathematical Condition', 'Philosophical Notions 
and Orientations' and 'Philosophical Figures'. Each section, in 
turn, is comprised of four chapters. 
In the first group of chapters, in his piece 'What Is Post-
Cantorian Thought? Transfinitude and the Conditions of 
Philosophy', Tzuchien Tho begins by examining the role of Cantor 
in Badiou's thought. Tho provides an account of what would con-
stitute a post-Cantorian context of thought, and of how Badiou's 
work can be understood to be post-Cantorian. On the one hand, 
Cantor's development of the transfinite for mathematically fixing 
the coordinates of the concept of the infinite represents a sig-
nificant development in the history of mathematics. On the other 
hand, however, this work has far-reaching ontological implica-
tions. Through Cantor's provision of a transfinite multiplicity, the 
metaphysical reliance on unity to render the multiplicity of being 
intelligible and consistent could be overcome with a discourse on 
multiplicity that is uncoupled from a horizon of unity and total-
ity. The formal sense of the infinite derived from the mathemati-
cal legacy of Cantor's work represents a definitive shift from the 
dialectic between the one and the multiple. What is at stake in this 
problematic is the very basis of Badiou's mathematical ontology, 
and Tho's work provides a clear account of the contours of this 
problematic and of how Badiou negotiates them. 
Sean Bowden's chapter, entitled 'The Set-Theoretical Nature 
of Badiou's Ontology and Lautman's Dialectic of Problematic 
Ideas', reconstructs the nature of Badiou's 'debt' to the French 
philosopher of mathematics, Albert Lautman - a debt to which 
Badiou alludes in Being and Event but never explains in any detail. 
Bowden shows that Badiou's assertion that set theory is ontology 
depends upon what Lautman would call a 'dialectic of problem-
atic Ideas' - a line of thought which runs counter to more stand-
ard accounts of Badiou's metaontology which rather focus on the 
importance of the 'doctrine of conditions'. Following the work 
of Lautman, Bowden argues that Badiou's set-theory ontology is 
grounded insofar as it resolves a series of 'ontological problems' 
which can be expressed in the form of 'dialectical couples' such as 
the one and the multiple, Nature as poem and Nature as Idea, the 
finite and the infinite, and the continuous and the discrete. Bowden 
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demonstrates how the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms (which are, for 
Badiou, the 'laws of being') together resolve this series of opposed 
notions. In concluding, Bowden also indicates some of the poten-
tial problems of Badiou's Lautmanian heritage, including the idea 
that Badiou is left without a unified conception of being, since 
being is said in one way for the ontological situation in its depend-
ence on a prior dialectic of problematic Ideas, and in another way 
for what the ontological situation, so determined, can say of situ-
ational being in general. 
In 'Badiou's Platonism: The Mathematical Ideas of Post-
Cantorian Set Theory', Simon Duffy examines the importance 
of Plato to the mathematical basis of Badiou's ontology, and 
how Plato is instrumental in determining how Badiou positions 
his philosophy in relation to those approaches to the philoso-
phy of mathematics that endorse an orthodox Platonic realism. 
Badiou's Platonism bears little resemblance to this orthodoxy. 
Like Plato, Badiou insists on the primacy of the eternal and immu-
table abstraction of the mathematico-ontological Idea. However, 
Badiou's reconstructed Platonism champions the mathematics 
of post-Cantorian set theory, which itself affirms the irreducible 
multiplicity of being. In effect, Badiou reorients mathematical 
Platonism from an epistemological to an ontological problematic, 
a move that relies on the plausibility of rejecting the empiricist 
ontology underlying orthodox mathematical Platonism. To draw 
a connection between these two approaches to Platonism and to 
determine what sets them radically apart, Duffy focuses on the use 
that they each make of model theory to further their respective 
arguments. 
Rounding out this section, Anindya Bhattacharyya investigates 
what is at stake for Badiou's ontology in the shift from set theory, 
in Being and Event, to the theory of categories and topoi in Logics 
of Worlds. 'Sets, Categories and Topoi: Approaches to Ontology 
in Badiou's Later Work' shows that while Badiou remains com-
mitted to the declaration that 'mathematics is ontology', the 
contrast between set-theoretical and categorical 'foundations' of 
mathematics is a stark one. The strategy that Badiou adopts to 
bridge the gap between sets and categories is to make use of topoi, 
which are the categorical generalisation of sets. However, this still 
leaves Badiou's ontology indirectly anchored in the 'foundational' 
ontological questions presented in set theory. Bhattacharyya sug-
gests that Badiou's ontology can be radicalised further by stripping 
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it of its residual attachment to classical set theory, and that this 
will allow one to maintain Badiou's subordination of philosophy 
to its mathematical condition while radically transforming the 
content of the mathematical ontology that condition prescribes. 
The following section, 'Philosophical Notions and Orientations', 
commences with Ed Pluth's chapter, 'The Black Sheep of 
Materialism: The Theory of the Subject'. Pluth argues that there 
are multiple senses of materialism at work in Badiou's philosophy, 
only some of which are justified. The sense of materialism crucial 
to Badiou's later work is that materialism equalises or levels down 
what might otherwise be construed as distinct regions and orders 
of being. At first glance this would appear to expose Badiou to the 
criticism of being a monist, and Pluth endorses this criticism by 
arguing that Badiou's attempt to use matter as a name for being 
in Theory of the Subject represents a monistic stumbling block for 
his position at the time. However, Pluth also finds within the same 
text a more promising line of reasoning, according to which the 
primary category of a materialism need not be matter but rather 
the 'conceptual black sheep' of materialism, namely the subject 
itself. Pluth provides an account of the theory of the subject as 
presented in the Theory of the Subject, and of why Badiou feels 
that a theory of the subject is required for the development of 
an adequate materialist philosophy. In doing so, Pluth mounts a 
defence of what some consider to be the overly religious character 
of some of the language that Badiou uses to thematise the subject 
and its relation to truth. 
James Williams' contribution explores and then critiques 
Badiou's approach to time in both Being and Event and Logics 
of Worlds. In 'A Critique of Alain Badiou's Denial of Time in his 
Philosophy of Events', Williams objects to the account of time 
bound up with Badiou's idea of fidelity to eternal truths. For 
Williams, eternal truths are fictions, and the world's only charac-
ter is that of becoming. So it follows that, for him, subjective com-
mitment to eternal truths entails a threefold denial of: the passing 
quality of truths, the passing quality of the world and worldly 
things, and ordinary and valuable modes of temporal existence 
bound up with this world of becoming. In the sacrifice of becom-
ing to eternal truths, Williams thus sees a potential for violence - if 
not direct and necessary violence, then at least a 'violence of con-
sequences'. Badiou's eternal truths are potentially, for Williams, 
'lethal fictions'. 
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In 'Doing Without Ontology: A Quinean Pragmatist Approach 
to Badiou', Talia Morag identifies two mutually exclusive roles 
that set theory plays in Badiou's philosophy. One that is straight-
forwardly metaphysical is concerned with the question of the 
creation of new kinds of objects. The other Morag identifies as 
implicitly pragmatic and is related to questions about what kinds 
of objects there are. By pursuing a discussion of the latter in rela-
tion to the texts Being and Event and Logics of Worlds, Morag 
aims to demonstrate on the one hand that Badiou can contribute 
to contemporary neo-pragmatism, insofar as the new Badiouian 
picture of reality can actually give content to contemporary prag-
matist theses about the nature of sets. On the other hand, Morag 
aims to show that, from a pragmatic point of view, that is if we 
begin our ontological enquiry not with mathematics but instead 
with our explanatory practices, then Badiou's philosophy can be 
released from what she characterises as its inflated ontology. 
Finally, Nina Power's contribution to this volume, 'Towards 
a New Political Subject? Badiou Between Marx and Althusser', 
brings to light a set of tensions which define Badiou's ongoing 
work on the political subject. Following Power, Badiou occupies 
a narrow theoretical ground between Communism and Marxism, 
between Althusserian anti-humanism and the humanism of the 
early Marx, between an acknowledgement of the historically 
unique potential in the current state of global capital and an 
affirmation of transhistorical communist invariants, and between 
a commitment to a purely 'generic humanity' and the necessity 
of naming the political subject for practical purposes. Power 
traces the difficult line that Badiou feels himself forced to tread 
with regard to the political subject. On the one hand, she shows 
how Badiou's Communism dehistoricises Marxism using, in 
part, Althusser's critique of historical materialism and associated 
critique of the subject as a mere effect of ideology. But on the 
other hand, Power argues that Badiou, contra Althusser, never 
relinquishes a more substantive notion of the subject as 'generic 
humanity'. The question remains, however, as to how we are to 
think this political subject in concrete terms when its concept has 
been emptied of all content. 
The third and final section of the collection examines Badiou's 
relation to a number of philosophical figures who have been 
central to the elaboration of Badiou's oeuvre. Justin Clemens' 
and Adam J. Bartlett's article tracks Badiou's complex engage-
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ment with Lacan from Theory of the Subject through to Logics of 
Worlds, showing that having worked through Lacan's particular 
brand of 'anti-philosophy' was crucial for Badiou. They expli-
cate a number of decisive instances where Badiou's thought was 
informed as much by its proximity to Lacan's as by the effort to 
overcome it in specifically philosophical directions. The issues 
they address include: the question of the subject and its relation-
ship to the articulation of truth; the doctrine of philosophy's 
extra-philosophical 'conditions'; philosophy's relation to 'anti-
philosophy' as well as to sophistry; the question of 'the localisa-
tion of the void'; the relationship between the matheme and love; 
and the formal theory of the body developed in Logics of Worlds. 
In each of these cases, Clemens and Bartlett show how Badiou 
engages with Lacan in a nuanced and sympathetic way while also 
revealing certain impasses in his thought - impasses whose resolu-
tion take Badiou beyond Lacan without simple repudiation. 
Following on from this, in 'Badiou and Sartre: Freedom, from 
Imagination to Chance', Brian A. Smith examines the importance 
of Sartre for the formation of Badiou's thought. As Smith shows, 
Badiou remains faithful to Sartre as a philosopher of decision, 
sharing his commitment to the relationship between freedom 
and decision. At the same time, however, it is demonstrated how 
Badiou, in his attempt to re-found the political subject, pushes 
beyond the Sartrean conception of the subject or for-itself as the 
substantial ontological ground of change and free action. For 
Badiou, change and freedom - and indeed the subject itself - rather 
depend upon something which is in excess of given, ontologically 
stable situations, namely the event. Smith traces the contours 
of Badiou's explicit and implicit engagement with Sartre from 
Theory of the Subject through to Being and Event, examining in 
detail Sartre's varying accounts of freedom, Badiou's critique of 
Sartre's notion of the group, the use Badiou makes of Lacan to 
get beyond Sartre in Theory of the Subject, and the final rigorous 
formulation of the relationship, to be found in Being and Event, 
between the situation, the event, decision, freedom, the subject 
and group action. 
In 'Badiou's Relation to Heidegger in Theory of the Subject', 
Graham Harman examines Badiou's admiration of Heidegger 
as one of the central thinkers of our time in connection with 
his early work, Theory of the Subject. Harman investigates the 
points of congruence and tension between these two thinkers, 
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specifically the extent to which Badiou can be said draw upon the 
main Heideggerian thesis of the ontological difference, and the 
adequacy of this engagement. As to whether Badiou's interpreta-
tion of the ontological difference in Heidegger is correct, Harman 
concludes that despite being unorthodox, Badiou's instincts are 
basically correct. Heidegger emerges as a key ally in Badiou's 
deviation from both Hegel and Lacan, and a key figure for the 
subsequent developments in Badiou's thought. 
Finally, in 'One Divides into Two: Badiou's Critique of Deleuze', 
Jon Roffe sheds new light on Badiou's provocative reading of 
Deleuze in The Clamor of Being. Contrary to many of the responses 
to this work, both positive and negative, Roffe points out a number 
of facts which have not previously been discussed. Firstly, The 
Clamor of Being's major claim - that Deleuze is a philosopher of 
the One - is not so much intended to be a criticism of Deleuze as to 
present a point of contrast between the two philosophers. Secondly, 
the only substantial critical point that Badiou pursues in The Clamor 
of Being bears on Deleuze's formulation of the relation between the 
virtual and the actual. In short, Badiou reads Deleuze as introduc-
ing an indefensible notion of a 'virtual image' in order to cover over 
a flaw in his account of the virtual-actual relationship in Difference 
and Repetition. As Roffe shows, however, Badiou's reading of 
Deleuze on this point fails to take into consideration the math-
ematical, Kantian and Maimonian account of the virtual-actual 
relationship to be found in Difference and Repetition. Furthermore, 
Badiou reconstructs the concept of the 'virtual image' in Difference 
and Repetition with reference to Deleuze's discussion of the 'virtual 
image' in the much later text, The Time Image. As Roffe demon-
strates, however, what is named by the term 'virtual image' in each 
of these works is very different, meaning that Badiou's main cri-
tique of Deleuze in The Clamor of Being ultimately fails. 
Overall, what emerges from these essays is a critical snapshot of 
Badiou's relationship to, impact on and importance for the disci-
pline of philosophy. Contrary to the popular image of Badiou as 
a radical and even iconoclastic figure, he appears here as a thinker 
engaged, whether directly or indirectly, with some of philosophy's 
most central and time-honoured figures and concerns. It is hoped 
that the many critical lines of enquiry opened up by the studies 
comprising this volume can be pursued more fully elsewhere, and 
to productive effect, to the benefit not only of Badiou studies, but 
also philosophy's open future. 
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Notes 
I. See also on this point, Oliver Feltham's 'Translator's Preface' to Being 
and Event, where he writes that, for Badiou, 'philosophy must remain 
mobile by circulating between a plurality of its conditions and its own 
history' (BE xix). 
2. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Oliver Feltham's entry, 
'Philosophy', in A. J. Bartlett and Justin Clemens (eds), Alain Badiou: 
Key Concepts (Durham, NC: Acumen, 2010), pp. 22-3. 
3. Alain Badiou, 'Mathematics and philosophy', trans. Simon Duffy, 
in Simon Duffy (ed.), Virtual Mathematics: The Logic of Difference 
(Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2006), p. 2 5. 
4. See Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003 ), p. 5 5. 
